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reported. Badgers and binturong have 
been housed in zoological gardens 
for decades without incidence of 
infl uenza. Increased surveillance for 
infl uenza by the scientifi c community 
during the pandemic may have resulted 
in the novel recognition of infection 
in these species. Alternatively, the 
current pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus 
may have a broader host range and 
stronger virulence than viruses in the 
past.
Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 was fi rst 
detected in humans in March 2009 
and reached pandemic levels by June 
of that year, rapidly establishing a rich 
pool for the development of genetic 
variants. Naturally acquired disease 
has now been described in 10 animal 
species, and experimental infection 
has been reported in an additional 
2 animals (mice and cynomolgus 
macaques) (9). The ubiquity of 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 and its ability 
to infect a diverse range of hosts is 
worrisome for the health of wildlife 
and for the possibility of creating 
additional reservoirs that could alter 
the evolution of subtype H1N1 viruses 
by applying varied selection pressures 
and establishing new ways of 
generating unique reassortant strains. 
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To the Editor: The biologic role 
of amino acid variants at position 
222 of the hemagglutinin (HA) gene 
of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus in 
severe infections has been extensively 
discussed. A recent series of studies 
(1–3) confi rm the initial suggestions 
that G or N in this position might 
confer greater pathogenic potential 
to the virus than to the wild type. In 
contrast, their data suggest that no 
particular pathogenicity is associated 
with the 222E variant because it 
occurs at the same frequency in 
severe and mild infections. Most 
authors also seem to agree that 
D222G or N appears sporadically in 
phylogenetically distant viruses, with 
limited transmissibility.
However, Puzelli et al. (4) 
reported transmission of a 222G 
mutant from son to father (with the 
appearance of an additional G155E 
mutation). In Italy, the pattern of 
D222 variants has been peculiar, with 
extremely rare appearances of 222G 
and high diffusion of 222E isolates. 
At the National Institute for Infectious 
Diseases in Rome, 82 isolates 
(GenBank accession nos.  CY063455–
CY063469 for new sequences in this 
study) were monitored for D222 
variants. No 222G or N variants were 
detected, even in 24 severe infections, 
nor was the G155E mutation detected. 
This fi nding was not surprising, given 
the worldwide low frequency of this 
mutation, even in severe infections.
Conversely, D222E was detected 
in 12 of the 82 cases, peaking in 
September 2009, when it was present 
in most of the infections, with no 
overrepresentation in severe cases. 
Subsequently, it was substituted by 
different 222D viruses during the 
autumn–winter outbreak. The analysis 
of publicly available sequences from 
 Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 17, No. 4, April 2011 749
LETTERS
other centers in Italy confi rmed the 
trend: 222E was the dominant variant 
during the summer, 222G was detected 
only in 4 cases, and 222N was never 
detected. As we previously reported 
(5), phylogenetic analysis of 222E 
variants allowed identifi cation of them 
as an authentic circulating subclade of 
clade 7 (6) or cluster 2 (7), rather than 
as sporadically occurring variants.
To further investigate the origin 
and the evolution of 222 variants, 
we have extended the phylogenetic 
analysis (neighbor-joining) to 2,492 
complete HA sequences from the 
Global Initiative on Sharing All 
Infl uenza Data database (expanded 
Figure online, www.cdc.gov/EID/
content/17/4/749-F.htm), confi rming 
the clustering of all the worldwide 
222E variants in a well-defi ned 
subclade (Figure; expanded Figure 
online). The same analysis showed that 
D222G variants could be reconciled 
with 2 different phylogenetic patterns. 
The fi rst less frequent pattern includes 
sequences appearing sparsely 
throughout the tree, confi rming the 
mentioned hypothesis of sporadic 
mutation. In contrast, the second 
pattern (the majority) relates to small 
groups of sequences appearing in 
monophyletic microclusters. Among 
these microclusters, 2 are particularly 
interesting because they include only 
222G sequences, isolated in different 
parts of the world (expanded Figure 
online). This fi nding is still compatible 
with sporadic mutation; bootstrap 
values are low because of the low 
general variability of these sequences. 
However, the possibility that D222G 
variants are transmissible and might 
sustain small epidemics of their own 
or that they might arise more easily 
from specifi c, phylogenetically related 
backgrounds, is intriguing. In a few 
countries, such as Italy, Norway, 
or Sweden, where the 222E virus 
has been circulating as a substantial 
proportion of the total virus, the 222G 
variants appeared more frequently 
in the genetic context of the 222E 
virus (1,4), as demonstrated by 
phylogenetic analysis and confi rmed 
by the analysis of codon 239 (the 
codon determining the 222 residue 
specifi city): GAA to GGA (E to G), 
instead of GAT to GGT (D to G). In 
these cases, the correct defi nition of 
222G variants would therefore be 
E222G rather than D222G. From this 
point of view, the 222N variant would 
have a higher genetic barrier to change 
from E because it would require 2 
mutations (GAA to AAT) instead of 1 
(GAT to AAT), and indeed none of the 
16 available (worldwide) 222N full-
length variants clustered with the 222E 
virus. On the basis of these fi ndings, 2 
different amino acids, D and E, might 
be considered polymorphic variants at 
position 222, and the potentially more 
pathogenic mutants or circulating 
variants would be G or N.
Maria Beatrice Valli, 
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Figure. Monophyletic pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus D222E cluster, including 98% of the global 
222E isolates. E222G variant isolates, as examples, respectively, from Italy (4), Norway (1), 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom, are indicated by arrows. The sequence labels represent 
the Global Initiative on Sharing Avian Infl uenza Data serial numbers; those of particular 
interest for this study are indicated by the strain name or country of origin. An expanded, color 
version of this fi gure is available online (www.cdc.gov/EID/content/17/4/749-F.htm).
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To the Editor: On April 28, 
2009, the Chicago Department of 
Public Health received notifi cation 
of 1 student at an elementary school 
with a probable pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 virus infection; the infection 
was subsequently laboratory 
confi rmed. This case was one of the 
fi rst pandemic (H1N1) 2009 cases 
in Chicago. To prevent transmission 
of infl uenza and with guidance from 
the Chicago Department of Public 
Health, the school closed on April 29; 
it reopened on May 6 after the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC) revised its recommendations 
(1). We conducted an investigation to 
evaluate psychosocial and economic 
effects of the school closure on 
the students’ families and to assess 
whether students complied with 
mitigation recommendations. In the 
early pandemic, Chicago’s number of 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 cases was one 
of the highest in the United States (2).
Households were surveyed if >1 
child in the household was enrolled in 
the school and contact was made with 
an adult (parent/guardian). We made 
a minimum of 3 attempts to contact 
eligible households by telephone 
in English or Spanish. Households 
without working telephone numbers 
were visited, but only 1 visit 
yielded a completed interview. The 
school had an enrollment of 744 
students (609 households, of which 
439 were reachable by telephone) 
during April–May 2009. The fi nal 
sample comprised 170 households 
(39% of reachable households). 
Fifty-four (31%) respondents 
were employed full-time and 37 
(22%) part-time; 78 (46%) were 
unemployed, homemakers, students, 
or retired. Households had a median 
of 2 adults and 2 children in grades 
prekindergarten through eight.
In contrast with fi ndings of 
Johnson et al. (3) in an investigation of 
an infl uenza B virus outbreak, where 
89% of students visited >1 public 
location during the school closure, 
results from our investigation (Table) 
indicate that most students complied 
with recommended social distancing 
measures. Johnson et al. highlighted 
the potential for transmission in 
public areas during a school closure. 
However, with only approximately 
one third of households in this 
investigation reporting their children 
went to public areas during the school 
closure, the same level of concern of 
public transmission was not found.
The results from this investigation 
indicate the economic effect of the 
school closure was minimal for survey 
respondents. These results were 
similar to those found by Johnson 
et al. (3), which had only 18% from 
220 households (with 315 employed 
adults) report missing work to stay 
home because of school closure. 
However, the number of families 
losing work time in our investigation 
was much lower than the 53% of 
families in central Virginia reported by 
Nettleman et al. (4) using a survey of 
school absenteeism and employment 
status for adults who stayed home to 
care for an ill child. This might have 
been because 31% of respondents 
surveyed in this investigation were 
homemakers, and an additional 
10% were unemployed or retired. 
Therefore, many parents and legal 
guardians from this investigation 
did not need to noticeably change 
their daily routine to care for their 
children during the closure. Moreover, 
compliance has been shown to vary by 
income and employment status (5).
CDC guidance issued on April 
27, 2009, recommended closing any 
school that had a laboratory-confi rmed 
case of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 (1). 
As new information became available, 
CDC updated its recommendations, 
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